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a b s t r a c t
To enhance security in dynamic networks, it is important to evaluate the vulnerabilities and
offer economic and practical patching strategy since vulnerability is themajor driving force
for attacks. In this paper, a hybrid ranking approach is presented to estimate vulnerabilities
under the dynamic scenarios, which is a combination of low-level rating for vulnerability
instances and high-level evaluation for the security level of the network system.Moreover,
a novel quantitative model, an adapted attack graph, is also proposed to escaping isolated
scoring, which takes the dynamic and logic relations among exploits into account, and
significantly benefits to vulnerability analysis. To validate applicability and performance of
our approach, a hybrid ranking case is implemented as experimental platform. The ranking
results show that our approach differentiates the influential levels among vulnerabilities
under dynamic attacking scenarios and economically enhances the security of network
system.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Estimating the influences of vulnerabilities under network scenarios has becomemore andmore complicated, primarily,
owing to the complex multi-steps and multi-hosts exploitations deployed by the system attackers. Scoring systems that
separately consider vulnerabilities are currently deemed insufficient. Despite the dominance of scanner-like Nessus, a
method to identify vulnerabilities using predefined rules, it was observed that network administrators could only separately
score the scanned vulnerability through CVSS (common vulnerability scoring system) [1], given security metrics provided
by NVD (national vulnerability database) [2,3]; however, they cannot fully deliver optimal security measures for dynamic
network system. Thus, it is essential to propose an overall security rate reflecting the secure level of dynamic network at a
particular scenario to accurately estimate the global influential levels of exploits.
To evaluate the security rate of a dynamic system, an appropriate model that considers various aspects and factors,
and which likewise mimics the attacker’s choice of exploits, should be set up. Researchers have conducted remarkable
work on generating and ranking attack paths to analyze and model such multi-step and multi-agent attacks in order to
provide high-level security metric for risky measurement. In this study, we propose an attack graph model that mimics the
attacker’s attacking strategy, and then chose a mathematical method to quantify the security level of a network scenario
after assigningweight to each edge (vulnerability instance) in the attack graph. However, rather than focusing on optimizing
attack graph generating algorithms or designing attack graph semantics, a different work from previous works mentioned
in [4], we assumed that the attack graph to describe the attacking scenario, could be acquired from existing attack graph
generation tools like TVA, the topological vulnerability analysis system [5]. The main goal of this study is to prioritize the
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vulnerability instances by modeling the elimination of their influences on the estimated network scenarios. And the main
contribution of our work is to render a hybrid security metric for quantifying and ranking the security level of particular
network system under particular time and situation. Combining the graph generation and analysis tools [6,7] with security
metrics, it is effective to weigh the pros and cons of decisions on choosing patching orders of these vulnerabilities, and take
more economic and efficient hardening strategy for given network scenarios.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic concepts and hybrid ranking approach;
Section 3 describes our implementation of CVSS for the low-level rating; and thereafter ourmethod for high-level evaluating
via modeling the selected attacking strategy is given in Section 4. In Section 5, a round estimation sample of an enterprise
network is rendered and thus concrete case study is performed and its results are analyzed. In Section 6, related works are
introduced and compared with our work. Finally, conclusion and future work is provided in Section 7.
2. Hybrid ranking approach
2.1. Basic concepts
To describe the framework and make our study more clearly, in this section, we first introduce some basic concepts and
give all notations used in this paper.
Definition 1. Adapted attack graph (A-AG) is an adjustable attack graph, composed by two types of nodes and two types
of arcs, which is a valuable tool to network defenders, illustrating paths an attacker can use to gain access to a targeted
network.
There are two types of nodes in A-AG: state node and vulnerability instance node. State node represents an attacker’s
access privilege on host in a given network scenario. Outgoing arcs from state nodes point to the vulnerability instances
that can be exploited by an attacker. State node in A-AG shares almost the same meaning as that in MP-AG (multi-
prerequisite attack graph) [8], but the difference lies in the outgoing arcs from state node. In A-AG, outgoing arc from
state node is a precondition arc, which emphasizes the leading precondition for triggering the next vulnerability instance.
However, in MP-AG all arcs are meaningless. Source state node represents a state from which an attacker can trigger
several vulnerability instances. In A-AG, the source state node is connected to several vulnerability instances through
the corresponding precondition arcs. Destination state node represents a state that an attacker can arrive at after the
chosen vulnerability instance is issued successfully. In A-AG, the vulnerability instance leading to a destination state node
is connected by the transferring arc. Vulnerability instance node represents the vulnerability instance that can be triggered
from a certain source state node if given enough preconditions. Each outgoing transferring arc from vulnerability instance
node points to a destination state node that the attacker can reach after successfully exploiting the related vulnerability
instance. Vulnerability instance node in A-AG has the same meaning as the vulnerability instance node of the MP-AG
model [8].
An example of A-AG is shown in Fig. 1, which is inspired from the structure of MP-AG, providing an appropriate
description of the attacking process and an illustration of the whole network attacking scenarios. As shown in Fig. 1, state
node is depicted as a circle and the vulnerability instance node is depicted as a triangle. To indicate attacking path, two types
of arcs are stretched out to connect and show the consecutive order of the nodes, which are precondition arc, depicted by
white arrowhead, and also a transferring arc, depicted by black arrowhead.
Definition 2. Vulnerability instance (Vul_Inst) is a series of actions deployed by an attacker when performing an atomic
attack to issue certain vulnerability. In attack graph, a Vul_Inst is described through its corresponding vulnerability instance
node combined with its precondition arc.
Definition 3. Attacking path specifies a path in an attack scenario that leads to an escalation of privilege sets from network
hosts.
Attacking path shows how an attacker can level up his or her access to a network system. A-AG uses the consecutive
order of state nodes, precondition arcs, and Vul_Inst nodes to describe the dynamic attacking paths of network scenarios.
Definition 4. Crucial rate (δ) is assigned to Vul_Inst in order to numerically describe its crucial level.
Crucial rate emphasizes both vulnerability’s impact and its frequency of being exploited.We use vulnerability impact rate
(VIR) tomeasure theharmful possibility to a host if the vulnerability is utilized by an attacker. Vulnerability exploitability rate
(VER) ponders the difficulty of exploiting a vulnerability, which depends on the host’s configurations and the complexity of
deploying the vulnerability by an attacker. The higher the VIR, themore harm the vulnerability brings to the host; the higher
the VER, the more exploitable is the vulnerability, and the exploitation is more frequent. Therefore, we use both the VIR and
VER of vulnerability to describe the crucial level of single vulnerability. However, every Vul_Inst is a different case under a
specific attacking scenario. Crucial rate should reflect the difference between vulnerability instances, even when they are
corresponding to the same vulnerability. The stakeholder can assign weights to VIR and VER, to differentiate vulnerability
instances from different source states and related destination states.
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Fig. 1. An example of an adapted attack graph.
Definition 5. Vul_Inst elimination is an action that the administrator performs to fix the vulnerability in a certain host by
patching or reconfiguring the system.
Definition 6. Dwindled attack graph is a degraded attack graph that generated after a time of Vul_Inst elimination has been
completed and a new corresponding network scenario has been formed.
Definition 7. Original attack graph is a complete attack graph that generated without performing any elimination.
With Vul_Inst elimination, the whole network scenario would be adapted. In estimation process, Vul_Inst elimination
acts as removing the Vul_Inst and its successive nodes and arcs of the original attack graph. However, if the successive
attacking paths are available from other state nodes, they should be remained, since it indicates that the Vul_Inst remained
can be triggered from other attacking paths. An example of Vul_Inst elimination is shown in Fig. 2, where the elimination of
Vul_Insts, Ftp_rhost (1, 2) has no influence on its successive vulnerability instance node Local_setuid_buffer_overflow (2, 2),
because this vulnerability instance node is available from other attacking paths.
Original attack graph illustrates the original attacking status and secure level of network scenario. When estimating
vulnerabilities, Vul_Inst elimination is pondered by analyzing the different security rates between original AG and dwindled
AG. With this comparison, whether or not such a patching is applicable can be figured out. Thus, this study focus on the
quantification for the security rates related to the corresponding dwindled attack scenarios so as to provide a detailed rank of
all the picked vulnerability instances for making better hardening strategy under the whole network scenario. In estimating
approach, security rate of each dwindled attack graph is used to weigh Vul_Inst elimination, since a higher security rate
meansmore enhancement of security after the elimination.With that rank, it is easy to compare the influence of vulnerability
instances under network scenarios, and thus, prioritize them for network administrator.
2.2. Framework of hybrid ranking approach
Security issues can be considered as a dynamic process of preventing harm to the confidentiality, availability, and
integrity of information and services [1,6], but in a static and operational way. Therefore, it is possible to estimate the
influence of vulnerability by simulating the dynamic process of the attacker’s multi-step attacks under dynamic network
scenarios. In this section, we propose a hybrid ranking approach to estimate vulnerability, combining low-level rating via
CVSS and high-level evaluation for the security rate, which provides numerical estimation of the vulnerability influence
on the global network scenario by ranking of the dynamically adapted dwindled attack graph. Before hybrid ranking, if
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Fig. 2. An example of Vul_Inst elimination.
Fig. 3. Framework of hybrid ranking.
parts of the scanned vulnerability instances were evaluated to obtain an influential rank for patching, the eliminations
should be performed on these picked vulnerability instances. After eliminations, the original attack graph is converted
to the corresponding dwindled attack graph. Thus, the security level of the global network system can be checked via
the dwindled attack graphs. The higher the security level of the converted network scenario after elimination, the more
influential the vulnerability instances to the network before elimination. Fig. 3 illustrates the framework of proposed hybrid
ranking approach.
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The hybrid ranking method generates a rank to illustrate the different influential level of vulnerability instances under
checked network scenario. It is helpful to render better hardening strategies for vulnerability instances in the estimated
network. The executing process of hybrid ranking for vulnerability instance is as follows:
• Use CVSS rating module to rate VIR and VER of scanned vulnerabilities in a given network scenario via their attributes’
metrics, which can be set from the attributes vectors retrieved from NVD and former published vulnerability incidents
scoring data.
• Generate the original attack graph, describing the network attacking scenario, through the connectivity information and
the causal relationships of scanned exploits using attack graph generation tool, such as TVA-AG presented in [5].
• Assign vector [α, (1 − α)] to VIR and VER for all vulnerability instances, which appear in the original attack graph
with stakeholders specific concerns on vulnerability impact (VI) and vulnerability exploitability (VE) of each Vul_Inst in
particular attacking path, namely the source state and destination state of each Vul_Inst. The vector [α, 1− α] is defined
as the stakeholder’s weight vector. For experiment, default assignment of this vector is [1/2, 1/2].
• Compute the crucial rate δ of each Vul_Inst via VIR and VER, and generate the assigned weight vector for each scanned
Vul_Inst.
• Execute a single elimination for vulnerability instances submitted by the security requirement each time. Then, a
dwindled attack graph corresponding to the Vul_Inst elimination can be adapted from the original attack graph.
• Evaluate the security rate of each dwindled attack graph corresponding to its adapted attacking scenario and compare
the risk level of these dwindled attacking scenarios by the security rate.
• Prioritize the influential level of vulnerability instances through the rendered rank of the security rate for each dwindled
attack graph after performing the related Vul_Inst elimination.
3. Low-level rating via CVSS
This section reviews the 14 scoring attributes of CVSS and describes adaption approach including the process of obtaining
VI and VE rates. Then, a method for further computation of crucial rate from VI and VE is detailed. Finally, the main criterion
for high-level evaluation is also introduced.
3.1. A brief of CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an open framework that addresses the issues to obtain unified scores for
specific vulnerabilities in a commonway. The score of CVSS can reflect the cumulative experience of the CVSS-SIG as well as
extensive testing of real-world vulnerability incidents in end-user environments [1,6]. All theCVSS attributes vectors address
the objective characteristic of vulnerabilities and the subjective factors of attackers are not taken into account. CVSS2.0 is an
adaptable and standardized scoring method, which provides information about vulnerabilities on an operational level and
leaves stakeholders to add the information specific for their own explanations and needs. CVSS2.0 offers relatively accurate
evaluation metrics for security status evaluation, rather than categorizing attacks on a general basis or providing a general
model for evaluating security rate. In this study, hybrid rankingmethod adapts CVSS2.0 for low-level rating for Vul_Inst, and
the output of the low-level rating is taken as the evaluation metrics for high-level evaluating.
To make low-level rating more clear, we introduce three types of metrics and the attributes ofCVSS2.0 as follows, which
are the base metric (Bs), the temporal metric (Tp) and the environmental metric (Evr).
Basemetric evaluates the original and immutable attributes of vulnerabilities in terms of vulnerability exploitability (VE)
and vulnerability impact (VI). Exploitability includes access vector (Bs_AR), access complexity (Bs_AC) and authentication
(Bs_AU). Impact includes confidentiality impact (Bs_C), integrity impact (Bs_I), and availability impact (Bs_A). These two
aspects are what were emphasized in our low-level rating.
Temporal metric evaluates the dynamic aspects of vulnerability in terms of three attributes: Exploitability tools and
techniques (Tp_E), remediation level (Tp_RL), and report confidence (Tp_RC). Tp_E is related to the VE aspect and other two
is related to VI aspect.
Environmental metric evaluates three aspects of vulnerabilities that are dependent on the environment, which we
involve them both in the VE and VI rating of our low-level rating methods: Collateral damage potential (Evr_CDP), target
distribution (Evr_TD), and security requirements (Evr_SR).
3.2. Rating VI and VE by extending CVSS
Except for twelve attributes related to VIR or VER, two attributes, collateral damage potential (Evr_CDP) and target
distribution (Evr_TD), emphasize both the VIR and VER. Both VI and VE are addressed in the basic metrics of CVSS as the
fundamental assessing criteria for the objective aspects of vulnerabilities. However, CVSS focus on the overall ranking, which
is too complicated and general for low-level ranking. In this study, we adopt a novel computation mode by extending CVSS
metrics, which pay more attention on VI and VE.
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The followings are the computational formulas related to the VIR:
AdjustedImpact = 10.41[1− (1− Bs_C ∗ Evr_CR) ∗ (1− Bs_I ∗ Evr_IR) ∗ (1− Bs_A ∗ Evr_AR)] (1)
VIadapted = [(0.6 ∗ AdjustedImpact)− 1.5] ∗ f (Impact) ∗ Tp_RL ∗ Tp_RC (2)
VIR = [VIadapted+ (10− VIadapted) ∗ Evr_CDP] ∗ Evr_TD. (3)
The following formulas are related to the VER:
VEadapted = (0.4 ∗ 20 ∗ Bs_AR ∗ Bs_Ac ∗ Bs_AU) ∗ f (Impact) ∗ Tp_E (4)
VER = [VEadapted+ (10− VEadapted) ∗ Evr_CDP] ∗ Evr_TD. (5)
In hybrid ranking approach, VIR and VER are initial outputs of the low-level rating engine, as shown in Fig. 3. Both rates
of vulnerability, combined with the stakeholder’s specific concern for vulnerability instances, are further aggregated into
crucial rate δ of Vul_Inst. For this aggregation, the stakeholder only has to assign the weight vector to a special emphasis on
the concerned Vul_Inst. Our improvement provides a more convenient way for stakeholder to define rating vectors and the
input of the high-level evaluation can be easily obtained. Furthermore, the improvement can correspond to the CVSS overall
score well, which has been demonstrated through our tests on different sample vulnerability instances. We will detail the
accuracy of our rating in the analysis of the ranked cases.
3.3. Rating crucial rate
Crucial rate, the final output of the low-level rating, is also taken as the input of the high-level evaluation. Crucial rate
is generated from VI and VE, both of which are objective factors addressed by CVSS2.0. As mentioned above, VI is related
to the impact level to a host, given that a particular vulnerability is issued successfully; VE is related to the frequency of
attacker’s triggering certain vulnerability. The more exploitable the vulnerability, the more frequently it may be triggered,
and thus, the higher crucial rate. The crucial rate reflects not only the impact level and the frequency rate of vulnerability in
a statistical way via the uploaded CVSS scores, but also the stakeholder’s specific concerns for vulnerability instances under
a certain network scenario. Therefore, weights can be assigned to VIR and VER, respectively, for a particular emphasis. So,
the crucial rate of Vul_Inst can be numerically defined through VIR, VER, and the weight vector:
δ = αVIR+ (1− α)VER, α ∈ [0, 1], (6)
where [α, 1− α] is the weight vector addressed by stakeholders for their specific considerations of each Vul_Inst between
the consecutive source state and destination state along the attacking path. In this paper, default setting to weight vector is
[0.5, 0.5], if no particular vector assigned. Base on formula (6), the security stakeholder can conveniently define the weight
for each Vul_Inst with one assignment, and need not to care about the CVSS attribute metrics. Furthermore, crucial rate acts
as the input metrics of the high-level evaluation, which is defined numerically.
There is a primary assumption that the more crucial a Vul_Inst, the less expenditure is required for its exploitation. Here,
the expenditure is the probability for successfully cracking vulnerability in given time. Thus, there can be an invert ratio
between the crucial rate and the attacker’s expenditure given in each exploit. To achieve hybrid ranking, for low-level
rating, the objective factors is measured using the Formulas (1)–(6) to get crucial rate; for high-level evaluation, the mean
expenditure given by an attacker for triggering certain Vul_Inst is considered as themain criteria for describing the attackers’
subject factors. So, in next sectionwe evaluate the subjective factors bymimicking a common attacking strategy of attackers,
the one-step-forward strategy and a Markov stochastic model is chosen to describe the state-transition rate related to both
the mean expenditure and the vulnerability instances’ crucial rates. In this way, a numerical evaluation of the security level
of related network scenario can be rendered.
4. High-level numerical evaluation
In high-level evaluation, discovering the attackers’ strategy in selecting Vul_Inst is a highly difficult and critical task.
Provided that there were available preconditions, the attackers’ choice of vulnerability instances should not be a random
process. In low-level rating, we take into account the objective factors addressed by CVSS2.0 in order to define vulnerability
instance’s crucial rate, which is taken as the bridge for low-level rating and high-level evaluating. In this section, detailed
high-level modeling objectives and evaluation methodology is further expounded based on A-AG mentioned above.
4.1. Stimulating attacking path via OSFS
To simulate attacking path, lots of works have addressed on the attack strategy model, such as shortest path strategy
(SPS) and one-step-forward-strategy (OSFS) [9]. To implement SPS, the attacker should grasp the global system network,
deploying the most desirable attacks in their shortest path. Bu it is very difficult or even unnecessary for the attacker to
obtain this comprehensive information prior launching attacks. Even assuming some attackers could identify the shortest
attacking paths and deliberately deploy consecutive attacks, the number of vulnerability instances is quite small, since there
are few shortest attack paths or a probability of a single path to be identified.With these limited vulnerability instances along
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(a) A-AG model. (b) Stretching-out tree.
Fig. 4. An example of A-AG and stretching-out tree.
this few shortest attack-paths, it is difficult to rank all the vulnerability instances useful for security analysis. Therefore, we
pick up OSFS as a compensation for SPS, in terms of these above shortcomings when modeling attack strategies via SPS.
With this strategy, the attacker plunders target privileges and assets in each host step by step. At each stage of the
attacking process, only the available vulnerability instances in front of the source state node are considered. So in this study,
several assumptions regarding OSFS are made to define subjective factors of the attackers. Based on different objectives to
describe the subjective factors related to the attacking strategy, different assumptions can be made.
First, the attacker chooses one Vul_Inst among exploitable vulnerabilities that are one step ahead without considering
the expenditure of further attacks. Therefore, the higher the crucial rate of a Vul_Inst, the less expenditure is needed for
exploiting, and the more willingness of the attacker to choose the related Vul_Inst. Hence, the conditional probability
transition between two consecutive states addressed in the evaluationmodel should be able to reflect this attacking strategy.
If an elementary attack for the chosen Vul_Inst succeeded, the attacker should be expected to move forward to destination
state, that is, the attacker would prefer exploiting vulnerability instances that are one step ahead. Attackers are not expected
to return to previously available vulnerability instances that were not set off, who only focus ahead with no memory or
consideration of the past. So, when using A-AG as high-level evaluation, backward arcs are not addressed and a depth-
first-traverse is performed to extend attacking paths. Furthermore, it is always to ignore the situations, an attacker gives
up halfway, since traditional attack graph does not taken halfway behaviors into whenmodeling objectives. A-AG considers
every state as target that is similar in the real worldwherein every state ismeaningful for an attacker, or at least can be taken
as a stepping-stone for further attacks. So, merit is assigned to every state in A-AG model, whether or not it is considered a
terminal state.
It deems that an attacker would finally reach a state, given a path leading to the state exists and enough expenditure
is rendered. So, a depth-first-traversing manner is preferred to describe the OSFS since complete attacking paths can
be investigated. Under this manner, the attack graph stretches out like a tree to reflect the modeling objective, and all
vulnerability instances and attacking paths are fully illustrated. An example of stretching-out tree, as shown in right of
Fig. 4, is formed by the depth-first traversing of the attack graph model. Every leaf node represents the end of one possible
attacking path. Each edge in the stretching-out tree has been assigned a crucial rate δ to its corresponding Vul_Inst. Taking
node C as an example, three vulnerability instances with crucial rates of δc→d, δc→e, δc→f can be triggered from this node.
After selecting and successfully infiltrating one of these vulnerability instances, the attacker can gain more privileges of
certain hosts. A privileges escalation will be produced as attacker’s step into a deeper destination node among D, E and F .
With A-AG introduced in Section 2.1 and themore illustrative stretching-out tree, it is possible to stimulate the attacking
strategy OSFS graphically and define the conditional probability of state-transition. Each state node represents sets of
privileges in different hosts that the attacker has already captured. Transitions between source and destination states appear
when the attacker chooses and succeeds in exploiting corresponding Vul_Inst, permitting to continue plundering other
privileges and indicating that state nodes are continuously seized. The conditional probability of the state-transition can
be numerically defined through the evaluated objectives and chosen Markov stochastic model. In that case, the process for
attacker’s privileges escalation can be quantitatively measured through high-level evaluation.
4.2. Numerical definition of security rate
In order to numerically evaluate the security rate of network scenario related to each dwindled attack graph, a Markov
stochastic model has been chosen in high-level evaluation [9]. The implementation of this model has been addressed in
a previous work for computer security level estimation [10]. Considering it is a common stochastic model for security
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evaluation, we combine it with vulnerability instances rating via CVSS and the modeling of A-AG so as to provide a further
attempt on network security assessment.
In this paper, exponential distribution assumption is employed to quantify the mean expenditure rendered by the
attacker in each exploit. In the exponential distribution, pV (ε) is the probability of triggering V , the Vul_Inst, for state
transition between source state and destination state, while ε is the amount of expenditure given when exploiting Vul_Inst
and forwarding into the destination state node. Thus we have:
pV (ε) = p(Ex < ε) = 1− e−δε, (7)
where Ex is the equivalent expenditure froman attacker after successfully exploiting the desiredVul_Inst and thus advancing
into the destination state, δ represents the crucial rate corresponding to the given Vul_Inst.
The reason employing exponential distribution function is following: Firstly, assuming an atomic attack of certainVul_Inst
fails, the attacker can still maintain its former state, which corresponds to the ‘‘memory less property’’ of the exponential
distribution. Secondly, given available attacking paths to target state nodes, and provided enough expenditure ε, that means
ε → ∞ and p(ε)|ε→∞ = 1. With these prerequisites, certain target state node can be conquered. Furthermore, with
consideration of specific attacking scenario, crucial rate δ is assigned to each Vul_Inst, which can reflect the crucial level of
certain Vul_Inst separately. As the expenditure is described via exponential distribution, themean expenditure to succeed in
a given atomic attack is 1/δ, corresponding to the assumption that the higher crucial rate of a certain vulnerability instance,
the less mean expenditure is required for its exploitation. Also, we can define ε = 0, p(ε)|ε=0 = 0, that means attackers
cannot trigger vulnerability instant without expenditure provided.
When quantifying the security level, themain criterion for evaluation is deemed as themean expenditure (MEx) rendered
when issuing vulnerability instances by an attacker in order to conquer the target states. Asmentioned above, every Vul_Inst
node in the attacking scenario is assignedwith a crucial rate δ, which has an invert ratio to themean expenditure. Therefore,
the MEx of the whole network can be derived from the sum of the mean expenditure 1/δ, which is given by the attacker
when conquering successive destination state nodes in the attacking paths, also see in Fig. 4. This summing-up complements
our evaluation objective, tomeasure every state node in the given attacking scenario but notmerely the single terminal state
or single shortest attacking path.
Supposing δs→d is the specific crucial rate of the Vul_Inst between the source state s and destination state d, we can
have a detailed definition of δs→d in our high-level quantification: δs→d = αs→dVIR+ (1− αs→d)VER, αs→d ∈ [0, 1]. With
this definition of each Vul_Inst ’s crucial rate, we can combine low-level rating and high-level evaluating together for the
quantification of MExC for each dwindled attack graph and use this to rank the influential level of each corresponding
Vul_Inst. The mean expenditure rendered in state node s is denoted as MEx_s, which is related to all the vulnerability
instances that state s can reach within one step, just like all the outgoing edges from father node C to son nodes D, E and F
illustrated in the tree of example in Fig. 4. As the inverse ratio between crucial rate δ and the mean expenditure, MEx_s is
calculated by the inverse of the summing-up for all the vulnerability instances’ crucial rates related to state s, thusMEx_s is
given by:
MEx_s = 1
d∈dest(s)
δs→d
, (8)
where the set of destination state nodes directly related to the current source node s by different vulnerability instances in
the attack graph is defined as dest(s).
With stretching-out tree, the one-step-forward strategy for state transition can be illustrated. To define the conditional
probability transition from source state s to destination state d, we use δs→d × MEx_s. A detailed explanation can be
provided through the stretching-out tree. TheMEx_s of a father node s is determined by all direct related son nodes, thus the
larger crucial rate assigned to the edge related to a particular son node, the less mean expenditure required and the larger
possibility of the particular Vul_Inst on the edge being chosen and triggered by the attacker:
δs→d ×MEx_s = δs→d
d∈dest(s)
δs→d
. (9)
As Markov stochastic model is taken as the mathematical model, the quantification of the network security level can be
derived by the following iteration formula (10), node s is taken as the father node in the stretching out tree, then denoted
MEx_s as the total mean expenditure required from node s to all its leaf nodes. Therefore we haveMEx_s:
MEx_s =

i∈dest(s)
δs→i
i∈dest(s)
δs→i
×MEx_i+ 1
i∈out(s)
δs→i
, (10)
where 1
i∈out(s) δs→i
represents the mean expenditure rendered at the current state node s, out(s) is the set of all destination
nodes connecting with source state node s. The iteration part addresses the summing-up of the mean expenditure given at
each destination state node that is one step ahead.With this numerical evaluation of themean expenditure, we can describe
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Fig. 5. Network topology of ranking example.
Table 1
Targets description of ranking example.
Host Services Vulnerability OS
T0 1. IIS_Web_Service IIS buffer-overflow Window NT 4.0
T1
1. ftp ftp-rhost overwrite
Windows 2000 SP22. ssh ssh buffer-overflow
3. rshd rsh-login
T2
1. Netbios_ssn Netbios_ssn_nullsession Windows XP SP12. rshd
T3
1. LICQ LICQ-remote-to-user
Red Hat Linux 7.02. Squid_Proxy Squid-port-scan
3. Mysql_DB Local-setuid-buffer-overflow
thewhole security rate of the network scenario viaMEx_ini, where ini refers to the initial state node fromwhich the attacker
can initiate its consecutive attacks. The higher theMEx_ini, the more expenditure for attackers to plunder the states and the
better the whole security status is.
With quantifying security rate, the risk level of the dwindled network scenario can be evaluated. As illustrated by each
MEx_ini for a dwindled attack graph corresponding to the dwindled attacking scenario. The higher a MEx_ini, the more
secure a status after performing certain Vul_Instelimination and the more influential the Vul_Inst. Using this evaluating
methodology, we can perform the hybrid ranking procedure to estimate the influential level of each Vul_Inst on the whole
network through the relatedMEx_ini required by network. Our hybrid ranking approach is an efficient complement for the
static scoring of vulnerability. In an estimation procedure, not only is the crucial rate of each Vul_Inst calculated, but also the
security rate is quantified to indicate the influential level of each Vul_Inst in the estimated network system. Moreover, the
order for patching these vulnerability instances can be rendered according to the ranking of related security rate of dwindled
attack scenarios.
5. Experimental results
To validate proposed hybrid ranking approach for the estimation of influential level of vulnerability instances, a hybrid
ranking engine (HRE) has been developed to test several sample networks. In this section, a round and concrete case study
is depicted to show the performance of our hybrid ranking approach. Comparisons between our hybrid ranking and CVSS
scoring are also rendered and analyzed. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach can be a complementary work
to the CVSS scoring in measuring the influential level of vulnerability instance.
The topology of ranking example network is shown in Fig. 5, which is the same as the network topology used in [11].
There are four target hosts in internal network and a hacker host is in the external network separated by a firewall. The
internal target hosts’ information is show in Table 1, where T means target host.
The firewall in this sample network permits external hosts to connect to IIS web service running on T0, and connection
to all other services are blocked. The internal hosts are permitted to connect mutually within the internal network. The
connectivity among each host is given in Table 2, where Si represents the source host i and thus Ti represents the target
host i which contains several services that may be opened to a certain source host. The number 1, 2 and 3 represent the
open services which can be referred to the numbers assigned for each Ti in Table 1;−1 represents no warranted connection
allowed according to the firewall strategy; 0 means a self-connection.
Table 3 shows eight example vulnerabilities and their basic vectors retrieved from NVD and the assembled temporal
and environmental vectors from the samples. Fig. 6 is an original attack graph generated according to the above sample
network in Fig. 5 with no Vul_Inst elimination performed. Nine attacking paths can be investigated in the original attack
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Table 2
Connectivity of ranking example.
Host Attacker T0 T1 T2 T3
Attacker 0 1 −1 −1 −1
S0 −1 0 1, 2, 3 1, 2 1, 2, 3
S1 −1 1 0 1, 2 1, 2, 3
S2 −1 1 1, 2, 3 0 1, 2, 3
S3 −1 1 1, 2, 3 1, 2 0
Table 3
Vulnerability attributes vectors.
Vulnerability CVE IDs Basic vectors Environmental vectors Temporal vectors
CVE-2001-1030 AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P E:P/RL:O/RC:C CDP:H/TD:H/CR:H/IR:M/AR:H
CVE-1999-1455 AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P E:H/RL:O/RC:C CDP:H/TD:H/CR:M/IR:M/AR:M
CVE-1999-0180 AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P E:P/RL:O/RC:C CDP:H/TD:H/CR:H/IR:M/AR:M
CVE-2003-0661 AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N E:F/RL:O/RC:C CDP:H/TD:H/CR:H/IR:M/AR:M
CVE-2002-0364 AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P E:F/RL:O/RC:C CDP:H/TD:H/CR:M/IR:H/AR:M
CVE-2006-3368 AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N E:H/RL:O/RC:C CDP:H/TD:H/CR:H/IR:H/AR:M
CVE-2008-1396 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N E:F/RL:U/RC:C CDP:H/TD:H/CR:H/IR:M/AR:M
CVE-2001-0439 AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P E:H/RL:O/RC:C CDP:H/TD:H/CR:M/IR:H/AR:M
Table 4
Results of hybrid ranking.
Removed Vul_Inst (Ranking in order) S → D MEx_ini CVE IDs
1. IIS_buffer_overflow (0, 0) 0→ 1 +∞ CVE-2002-0364
2. Squid_port_scan (0, 3) 1→ 4 1.042701 CVE-2001-1030
3. Squid_port_scan (1, 3) 3→ 10 1.004924 CVE-2001-1030
4. Squid_port_scan (1, 3) 9→ 10 0.993117 CVE-2001-1030
5. SSH_buffer_overflow (0, 1) 1→ 3 0.941156 CVE-1999-1455
6. SSH_buffer_overflow (0, 2) 2→ 8 0.927974 CVE-1999-1455
7. Netbios-ssn-null session (0, 2) 1→ 2 0.924948 CVE-2003-0661
8. Netbios- ssn-null session (1, 2) 3→ 2 0.906139 CVE-2003-0661
9. ftp_rhost (0, 1) 1→ 6 0.895265 CVE-2008-1396
10. ftp_rhost (2, 1) 2→ 7 0.886722 CVE-2008-1396
11. LICQ_remote_to_user (1, 3) 10→ 11 0.870946 CVE-2001-0439
12. Squid_port_scan(2, 3) 2→ 5 0.836305 CVE-2001-1030
13. LICQ_remote_to_user (0, 3) 4→ 11 0.823693 CVE-2001-0439
14. Rsh_login (1, 1) 6→ 9 0.805711 CVE-1999-0180
15. Rsh_login (1, 1) 7→ 9 0.706708 CVE-1999-0180
16. Local-setuid buffer-overflow (3, 3) 11→ 12 0.677666 CVE-2006-3368
17. Squid_port_scan(1, 3) 8→ 10 0.653999 CVE-2001-1030
18. LICQ_remote_to_user (2, 3) 5→ 11 0.609754 CVE-2001-0439
graph by the OSFS depth-first-traversing. Moreover, it includes 13 state nodes, 18 preconditions arcs and 18 vulnerability
instances related to the precondition arcs. However, only 15 Vul_Inst nodes appear, since it can be possible the case that
several different vulnerability instances share the same Vul_Inst node with distinctions of state nodes and preconditions for
triggering different attacks. Both the Squid_port_scan (1, 3) and the Rsh_login (1, 1) instance fall into this case.
After ranking 18 vulnerability instances of the sample network in Fig. 5 via HRE, the results are gained in Tables 4 and
5. In Table 4, the number in front of each Vul_Inst elimination indicates its rank after estimating the security rates of the
related dwindled attack graph by HRE. In the column S → D, S stands for source state node and D is the destination state
node for the attacker to capture after succeeding in issuing certain Vul_Inst.
Comparing the ranking results of Tables 4 and 5 according to the adaptation of the given network systembetween original
attack graph and all dwindled attack graphs, the following conclusion are get from experimental results:
Firstly, the experimental results indicate the efficient on our implementation of CVSS for rating the VI and VE respectively,
and aggregating them into the Vul_Inst ’s crucial rate δ is applicable.
Through the order of the 18 crucial rates of vulnerability instances in Table 4, there is a good corresponding to the ranking
order of the 8 vulnerabilities comparing with overall CVSS scores. With the properly rated crucial rate, each Vul_Inst can be
checked. Moreover, more accurate information of each Vul_Inst ’s influential level using the high-level evaluation is grasped
by attacking crucial rates to each Vul_Inst node in the attack graph model and performing high-level evaluation.
Secondly, our hybrid ranking approach is much more appropriate to dynamic network scenarios.
After checking the two tables via CVE IDs, we can find that the CVSS ranking of the vulnerability IIS_buffer_overflow is at
6th, shown in Table 5. In contrast, through our hybrid ranking, it comes to 1st as shown in Table 4, which correspondswell to
the estimated attacking scenario. In original attack graph of Fig. 6, IIS_buffer_overflow (0, 0) is the first Vul_Inst to be triggered
and it is the very critical for Vul_Inst to stand out that no attacker can ignore or bypass, while deploying attacks. Without
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Fig. 6. The original attack graph for ranking example.
Table 5
Overall CVSS score and crucial rate.
CVE IDs CVSS result VIR VER δs→d Vul_Inst Elimination
1.CVE-2001-1030 8.4 6.664 7.116
6.900 2. Squid_port_scan (0, 3)
6.895 3. Squid_port_scan (1, 3)
6.860 4. Squid_port_scan (1, 3)
6.873 12. Squid_port_scan(2, 3)
6.881 17. Squid_port_scan (1, 3)
2.CVE-1999-1455 8.3 6.210 7.351 6.678 5. SSH_buffer_overflow (0, 1)6.667 6. SSH_buffer_overflow (0, 2)
3.CVE-1999-0180 8.2 6.446 7.116 6.781 14. Rsh_login (1, 1)6.781 15. Rsh_login (1, 1)
4.CVE-2003-0661 7.8 5.559 7.234 6.484 7. Netbios_ ssn_null session (0, 2)6.480 8. Netbios_ ssn_null session (1, 2)
5.CVE-2002-0364 7.8 6.446 6.519
6.471 13. LICQ_remote_to_user (0, 3)
6.471 18. LICQ_remote_to_user (2, 3)
6.469 11. LICQ_remote_to_user (1, 3)
6.CVE-2006-3368 7.7 6.446 6.443 6.445 1. IIS_buffer_overflow (0,0)
7.CVE-2008-1396 7.6 5.559 7.351 6.133 16. Local_setuid_buffer_overflow (3, 3)
8.CVE-2001-0439 7.5 5.643 6.919 6.217 10. ftp_rhost (2, 1)6.205 9. ftp_rhost (0, 1)
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issuing this Vul_Inst successfully, no deeper state nodes can be touched. Formulas (8) defines theMEx_s, through which we
found dest(s) = ∅, which indicates that after this instance node is eliminated, a single initial source node is left and all
its further state nodes turned unavailable for the attacker. In this case, our Markov stochastic model defines MEx_s → ∞,
meaningMEx_ini →∞, which can reflect the influential level of this initial and critical Vul_Inst.
Thirdly, our hybrid ranking approach can reflect the influential level of vulnerability instances more precisely, as the
estimation is processed under the dynamic attack graph scenarios.
Two vulnerabilities netbios_ssn_nullsession and LICQ-remote-to-user, share the same overall CVSS score of 7.8, and
given a coordinate rank 4th in Table 5. These sorts of coordinate rankings can happen frequently in CVSS, confusing on
patching order and hindering decision on taking hardening strategies. Checking ranking results, 2 vulnerability instances of
netbios_ssn_nullsession and 3 instances of the vulnerability LICQ-remote-to-user have been ranked. It is obvious that all the
instances of netbios_ssn_nullsession are ranked prior to the instances of LICQ-remote-to-user. It indicates that based on the
view of the whole security level, the elimination of each netbios_ssn_nullsession can providemore secure enhancement than
the elimination of LICQ-remote-to-user instances.
The MEx_ini of the dwindled network scenarios is also checked. When comparing between the original attack graph
and each related dwindle attack graph, all the three instances of LICQ-remote-to-user have only 2 state nodes ahead, state
11 and state 12 one Vul_Inst and one path in Fig. 6 for further attacking. While turning to the two Vul_Inst nodes of
netbios_ssn_nullsession, both of themhave 3 related paths including nine successive vulnerability instances and8 state nodes.
As the measuring objectives emphasize all the correlated states composing attack graph, it should take every available state
node as a meaningful one no matter whether it is an intermediate state node or a terminal one. Based from the measuring
objective, the more ahead state nodes shrink, the more improvement to the network security can be provided. Our ranking
results correspond well to this measuring objective. Therefore, the ranking reflects more accurate prioritizations of these
2 sets of vulnerability instances, and it can obtain a better order for handling these nearly undistinguishable vulnerability
instances.
Fourthly, the hybrid ranking approach can precisely distinguish different instances of the same vulnerability with
consideration of the given global attack scenario.
Even the same vulnerability can be ranked differently via evaluating each after patching distinctive vulnerability
instances in different paths. From all the 18 vulnerability instances, 5 are related to the vulnerability squid-port-scan, so
we take this set of instances as an analysis example. 5 vulnerability instances can be triggered from state nodes: state 1,
state 3, state 9, state 2 and state 8. The highestMEx of this set is provided by the elimination of squid_port_scan (0, 3) from
state 1 and the lowest is from state 8. State 1 is the direct state node that an attacker can trigger squid_port_scan (0, 3). If
eliminated, a path becomes unavailable including 2 successive state nodes, state 4 and state 11. On the contrary, the state
8’s successive state 10 is still available from both the state 9 and state 3, after the elimination of vulnerability instances
triggered from state 8. Moreover, to conquer state node 1, only one atomic attack should be issued from the state node 0.
However, conquering state node 8 requires at least 3 previous atomic attacks being successfully exploited.
Finally, the different vulnerability instances for the same Vul_Inst node triggered from different state nodes can be
prioritized through our hybrid system.
Two such cases appear in A-AG. One is rsh_login (1, 1) available from state node 6 and 7; the other is LICQ_Port (1, 3)
reachable from state nodes 3, 9 and 8. As state 6 and state 7 share the successive vulnerability instance node, rsh_login
(1, 1), all their successive paths bears no difference. In that case, the antecedent atomic attacks may contribute to their
differentiation. The original attack graph illustrates that there is only one intermediate state node 1 from state node 0 to 6.
However, for state 7, at least state 1 and state 2 or even state 3 should be obtained as preceding state nodes, which means
less pre-expenditure needed for reaching state 6 than for reaching state 7. It also indicates that more security improvement
can be gained to fix the Vul_Inst in state 6 than to eliminate the coordinate instance from state 7. TheMEx_ini different rates
of for these 2 Vul_Inst eliminations can reflect the difficulty of deploying attacks in the attacking scenario corresponding to
the influential level of Vul_Inst.
6. Related work
Much previous work on operational vulnerability evaluation based on CVSS has been rendered. Aussibal and Gallon
[12] describes a new distributed intrusion detection system based on CVSS framework. It employs the CVSS in a static
scoring, through a local CVSS database. On the other hand, adaptations have been made on the CVSS for specific needs.
Houmbet al. [13] estimates the impact and frequency rate of risky vulnerability via adapting the CVSS, and later Houmb has
used this method in a target of estimation (ToE) risk level assessment work [14]. These works prove that the CVSS can be
properly adapted and thus implemented based on stakeholders’ specific demands. Our low-level ratingmodule is also based
on an appropriate adaptation of the CVSS.
Apart from this, various works on modeling specific security status of systems can be found. Mohammadi and
Gharehpetian [15], for example, presents a core vector machine-based algorithm for on-line voltage security assessment
of systems. To classify the system security status, a CVM has been trained for each contingency. The proposed CVM-based
security assessment algorithm has a very small training time and space in comparison with support vector machines
and artificial neural networks-based algorithms. Al-Kuwaiti et al. present a systematic approach for determining common
and complementary characteristics of five widely-used concepts, dependability, fault-tolerance, reliability, security, and
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survivability, which consists of comparing definitions, attributes, and evaluation measures for each of the five concepts and
developing corresponding relations [16]. Study [8] has created a multiple-prerequisite attack graph (MP-AG) that scales
nearly linear as the size of a typical network increases. The proposed attack graph uses a depth first algorithm to create
the predictive attack graph. We have adapted the MP-AG model to define our attack graph model and a stretching tree can
be extended from the depth-first-traverse manner. Ammann et al. revisit the idea of attack graphs themselves and argue
that they represent more information explicitly than is necessary for the analyst [17]. They propose a more compact and
scalable representation, which relies on an explicit assumption of monotonicity, which states that the precondition of a
given exploit is never invalidated by the successful application of another exploit. Sheyner [18] presents an attack graph
to model exploitations of the security vulnerabilities in a system. An attack graph is considered as data structure, which
succinctly represents all paths through a system, which all end in a single state the final target of an attacker. However, in
our hybrid ranking, each state in our attack graph model is a goal with merit. We sum up all the expenditure of exploits to
every destination state node instead of the terminal ones. That means all the assets and privileges in the evaluated network
system can be defined as goals and have their value for attackers.
Many techniques for quantitative security analysis and attacking strategy modeling are presented. Khazan et al. present
simulation of a network system for quantitative security evaluation based on discrete-event simulation by SimEvents [10].
In [10], the system in normal state is simulated, an attacker ismodeled as a client bymeans of zombies attacks to the system,
then the availability of system begins to decrease, finally the system cannot respond to the requests. Peng Liu [19] renders
a game theoretic approach to infer attacker intent, objectives and strategies and thus the attacker objectives are practically
modeled. In [20], authors deal with various issues related to quantifying the security attributes of an intrusion tolerant
system, which facilitates the use of stochastic modeling techniques to capture the attacker behavior as well as the system’s
response to a security intrusion. However, we use a numerical definition of crucial rate for each Vul_Inst to quantify the
security rate of whole network scenario, but not only the attacking paths to measure computer security level. The previous
framework was proposed in [21]. In a generated graph, the most likely attack sequences are computed. The shortest path
cannot be a rounded criterion for the complete evaluation of scanned vulnerabilities, since the number of vulnerabilities in
the single shortest path is limited.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, a hybrid ranking approach is proposed to estimate the influential level of vulnerability instances in a
dynamic way. An adapted CVSS rating has been implemented to rate for the VE and VI of each vulnerability respectively and
aggregating them into the crucial rate of Vul_Inst for high-level evaluating. MEx_ini, the evaluated and quantified security
rate of corresponding dwindled attacking scenario, greatly provides a precise measurement on the influential level of
vulnerability instances under a viewof the dynamic and global network scenario,which renders better patching priority. The
main contribution of ourwork is to render a hybrid securitymetric for quantifying and ranking the security level of particular
network system under particular time and situation. Combining the graph generation and analysis tools with security
metrics, it is effective to weigh the pros and cons of decisions on choosing patching orders of these vulnerabilities, and take
more economic and efficient hardening strategy for given network scenarios. The experimental results also demonstrate the
applicability and accuracy of our hybrid ranking approach.
In future, we will focus on how to sharpen both the low-level rating and high-level evaluating in order for large-
scale network estimation. We will emphasize two crucial parts: Firstly, how to properly involve the stakeholders’ specific
considerations or experts’ experience into amore accurate aggregation of the crucial rate; Secondly, how to provide a flexible
framework to let network administrators predefine the suitable attacking strategies for simulation and the precise models
for quantification.
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